By: Ahmed Fathi
New York: One of the few surviving senior leaders in the group, Sheikh Naim Qassem, declared the group's readiness to follow UN Security Council Resolution 1701 just a day after the U.S. Department of State urged complete implementation of the resolution. For the stability of the Israel-Lebanon border, this initially looks like a major change. But closer inspection of what Resolution 1701 requires and the background of Hizballah's stance calls into question the genuineness of this declaration.
Adopted in August 2006 following the Second Lebanon War, UNSC Resolution 1701 demands that all armed groups—including Hizballah itself—as well as all militias leave their southern border. For a group that has long defined itself by its "resistance" against Israel, this settlement presents a basic threat to its identity. One wonders if Hizballah will consent to disarm and pull its troops out of the South.
For Hizballah, this announcement falls at a vulnerable point. Israel has stepped up its military activities aiming at the military and intelligence infrastructures of the group. Reportedly, these activities have resulted in major leadership losses, including the confirmed death of group leader Hassan Nasrallah. and his successor Hashem Safieddine. This development emphasizes the continuous instability in the armed group. Given these pressures, the timing of Hizballah's comment begs questions about whether it is a calculated move to reduce the present military pressure or a sincere attempt toward compliance.
Moreover, Hizballah's past of opposing disarmament makes the matter more complicated. The group has constantly presented its military capacity as absolutely necessary for Lebanon's defense against Israeli attack. Disarming would directly go against its basic values and diminish its impact on a local as well as regional level. The statement could be seen as a tactical ploy meant to lower immediate military pressure from Israel by giving Hizballah time to reorganize and review its plans.
Including Iran, the main supporter of Hizballah, and the actual group power adds still another level of complexity to this study. Iran helps Hizballah operate by providing significant military, financial, and logistical support, thus strengthening its capacities. Any major choice about disarmament or withdrawal would probably rely on Tehran's approval and strategic considerations. Iran's larger geopolitical agenda in the area might determine Hizballah's behavior, including how it manages the pressure from Israel and the world community.
Therefore, even if Hizballah's declaration first seems like a possible path toward peace, the historical background and the group's strategic alliances point to more of a political move than a genuine commitment to disarmament. Whether this is a real turning point in Hizballah's approach or just a temporary solution to buy time under growing pressure from Israeli military operations will depend much on the next weeks.
In essence, the matter is still in flux, and the actual consequences of Hizballah's declaration will depend on both group internal dynamics and outside pressure, especially from Iran and Israel. The international community will be watching closely to see how this complicated scenario develops.
Comments